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from a developed countries’ perspective. Merging detailed matched employer-employee data
relative to the Belgian manufacturing industry with unique information on firm-level upstreamness,
we investigate whether workers on the upstream stage of GVCs benefit from higher wages. We also
enrich our analysis with a gender dimension. Unconditional quantile regressions and decomposition
methods reveal that firms’ upstreamness fosters workers’ social upgrading. Nevertheless, gains are
found to be unequally shared among workers. Male top-earners are the main beneficiaries; whereas
women, irrespective of their earnings, appear to be unfairly rewarded.
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11. Introduction
The structure of the global economy has evolved dramatically over the past few decades. Recent
improvements in transport and communication technologies, along with advances in trade
liberalization, have prompted a wide geographical dispersion of production processes. Industries
and firms across the globe are today increasingly intertwined within networks of Global Value
Chains  (GVCs),  which  embody  the  full  range  of  activities  that  firms  undertake  to  bring  a
product/service from its conception to its end use by final consumers (OECD, 2012).
Consequently, products/services undergo multiple stages and cross borders several times, before
reaching final consumers. According to UNCTAD (2013), almost 80% of global trade occurs in
GVCs through exchanges of intermediate inputs.
The strategy of deepening integration (or upgrading) into GVCs is typically associated to an
opportunity for firms and countries to acquire greater access to global markets, increase their
competitiveness (Bamber and Staritz, 2016; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016), improve
employment (Farole, 2016; OECD, 2013), and foster income growth (OECD, 2012). Gereffi
(2005: 171) defines upgrading as: “the process by which economic actors - nations, firms, and
workers - move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production
networks”.1 Growing evidence suggests that high-value upstream (e.g. R&D/innovation) and
downstream (e.g. marketing/branding) production stages are often retained in more advanced
economies, while less profitable activities (e.g. manufacturing/assembly), generally located in the
middle of the value chain, remain mostly concentrated in transition/developing economies
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2016). This task-disaggregation process, apparently in the form of a
smile (Baldwin et al., 2014; Mudambi, 2008, Rungi and Del Prete, 2018; Shih, 1996), is key to
understand how firms and countries secure their competitive advantage and wealth over time
(Serpa  and  Krishnan,  2018).  At  the  same  time,  it  casts  serious  doubts  on  whether  GVCs’
integration benefits are fairly distributed across countries and workers.
Accordingly, recent researches have been focusing on the social dimension of upgrading.
The latter refers to the portion of the gains (in terms of e.g. wages, labour standards or wellbeing)
that is captured by workers at the different stages of global supply chains (Salido and Bellhouse,
2016).2 The social impact of GVC integration has been examined on employment (Farole, 2016;
OECD, 2013), jobs and wage inequality (Gonzales et al., 2015; Milberg and Winkler, 2013), and
– though to a limited extent and only for developing countries – on gender equality (Bamber and
Staritz, 2016; Barrientos et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2000; Rossi, 2013; Salido and Bellhouse 2016;
Staritz and Reis, 2013; Tejani and Milberg, 2010). Yet, access to and participation in GVCs is
2closely related to gender issues (Staritz and Reis, 2013). GVCs can indeed be considered as
gendered structures,  due to differences in the allocation of women and men across sectors,  jobs
and stages of supply chains. These differences are rooted in the roles women and men assume in
households and communities, typically determined by social norms rather than by one’s potential.
Despite significant heterogeneity, this holds true in both developed and developing economies.
When considering social upgrading in terms of gender and wages, research for developing
countries (Barrientos et al. 2011; Carr et al., 2000; Rossi, 2013; Salido and Bellhouse, 2016)
shows that GVC integration can, but does not necessarily lead to higher remuneration for female
workers. GVCs seem actually to exacerbate the gender wage gap and to take advantage of
existing gender norms to employ women in unskilled stages of the production chain, thus relying
on artificially low wages as a source of export competitiveness (Barrientos, 2014). A recent study
by Chen (2017) examines the impact of trade exposure on wage inequality within Chinese firms.
Results show that in downstream activities, intensively using unskilled labour engaged in
processing and assembly work, trade reduces within-firm wage inequality. However, trade is also
found to generate pro-competitive effects mainly benefitting to exporters and skilled labour (i.e.
mainly to men). In the case of developed countries, the issue of the gender wage gap has received
a great deal of attention in the context of trade liberalization (Ben Yahmed, 2013; Black and
Brainerd, 2004; Bøler et al., 2015, 2018; Busse and Spielmann, 2006; Juhn et al., 2014; Kongar,
2006; Oostendorp, 2009). However, an in-depth analysis of social upgrading and gender wage
inequality through the lens of GVCs is still missing.
The present paper aims to partially fill this gap in the context of a developed economy. More
precisely, we provide first evidence on the impact of a direct measure of firm-level upstreamness
(i.e.  the  steps  –  weighted  distance  –  before  the  production  of  a  firm  meets  either  domestic  or
foreign final demand) on workers’ wages. We also add to the existing literature by investigating
whether results vary for men and women and, more generally, how upstreamness contributes to
explaining the gender wage gap at different points of the earnings’ distribution. To do so, we rely
on matched employer-employee data, covering more than 250,000 workers, that are
representative  of  the  Belgian  manufacturing  sector  and  that  have  been  merged  with  a  unique
Firm-Upstreamness data set derived from the National Bank of Belgium business-to-business
(NBB B2B) transactions data set, developed by Dhyne et al. (2015). The latter provides a direct
and accurate measure of firm-level upstreamness for all years from 2002 to 2010.3,4
Our empirical strategy boils down to regressing individual workers’ wages on upstreamness,
while controlling for group effects in the residuals (Greenwald, 1983; Moulton, 1990), time fixed
effects, and a large set of covariates reflecting worker, job and firm characteristics. We also
3address the endogeneity of upstreamness using instrumental variables and appropriate diagnoses
tests. The consequences of being employed in more upstream firms is investigated for women and
men at the mean value of the earnings’ distribution but also at different quantiles. Using both
conditional (CQR) (Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005) and unconditional quantile
regressions  (UQR  -  Firpo  et  al.,  2009),  we  thus  investigate:  i)  whether  the  gains  associated  to
upstreamness are shared equally between high- and low-wage workers, and ii) whether the wage-
upstreamness elasticity evolves in similar way for women and men along the earnings’
distribution. To estimate the contribution of the upstreamness variable to the gender wage gap at
each quantile, we apply an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition based on UQR
techniques, namely the methodology developed by Fortin et al. (2011). Doing this, we compute
the share of the gender wage gap that can be attributed to: i) differences in mean values of firm-
level upstreamness for women and men, and ii) gender differences in wage-upstreamness
elasticities. This is done at different points of the earnings’ distribution. Finally, we test the
sensitivity of our estimates focusing on different components of workers’ wages (e.g. base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, bonuses).
Belgium represents a particularly interesting case study to examine the interaction between
social upgrading and gender wage inequality along the GVC. Indeed, it is a very open and
integrated economy with increasingly diversified trading partners. This is notably illustrated by
the GVC participation index, showing that Belgium sources more inputs from abroad and
produces more inputs used in GVCs than most other OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Estimates
of Dhyne et al. (2015) further indicate that 82% (99%) of commercial firms in Belgium, between
2002 and 2012, have been producing (consuming) goods and services that were either directly or
indirectly exported (imported). One of the most fragmented sector, with a particularly high GVC
participation rate, is the manufacturing industry: 91.6% (99.5%) of firms operating in this industry
are found to be directly or indirectly involved in exports (imports). This industry is thus an ideal
candidate to investigate the consequences of upstreamness on workers’ wages.
The Belgian labour market is also characterised by substantial earnings’ differences between
women and men. The gross monthly gender wage differential (excluding annual and irregular
bonuses) is estimated at around 22% in the private sector, and at a similar level in the
manufacturing industry (Institut pour l’égalité des Femmes et des Hommes, 2014). While most of
this gap can be accounted for by differences in worker, job and firm attributes, there still seems to
persist  a  significant  gap  (though  relatively  small  with  respect  to  what  is  observed  in  other  EU
countries) that cannot be accounted for by standard observables (Garnero et al., 2014;
Kampelmann et al., 2018; Rycx and Tojerow, 2002, 2004). This persistent inequality harms
4women’s labour market situation and career development as well as their social and personal
promotion. Furthermore, although numerically speaking, women nowadays practically level with
men on the labour market, recent research has shown that domestic and childcare activities remain
a haven largely avoided by the latter (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Meulders and O’Dorchai, 2004). As a
result, women are still far from reaching a work status which equals that of men in qualitative
terms (Del Boca and Repetto-Alaia, 2003; Redmond and McGuinness, 2017). While substantial
research has been devoted to the estimation and explanation of the gender wage gap, very little is
known regarding the role of GVCs, and of firms’ upstreamness as a cause of such wage
inequalities. Consequently, the latter is the main point of interest in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our data set and
corresponding descriptive statistics. Our estimation strategy and main econometric results are
described in Section 3. Section 4 provides some sensitivity analyses and the last section
concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Data
The present study relies on two large-scale data sets. The first is the Structure of Earnings Survey
(SES). This matched employer-employee survey provides detailed information on a large
representative  sample  of  workers  employed  in  the  manufacturing  industry  (i.e.  section  C of  the
NACE Rev. 2 nomenclature) over the period 1999-2010.5 Specifically,  it  contains  a  wealth  of
information, provided by the human resource departments of firms, both on the characteristics of
the latter (e.g. type of economic and financial control, number of workers, level of collective wage
bargaining) and on the individuals working there (e.g. age, education, tenure, gross earnings,
working hours, gender, occupation).
Data on workers’ wages (and different components thereof) and working hours are known to
be particularly precise and reliable in the SES. Yet, this data set contains no information on firms’
position in GVCs. Therefore it has been merged, by Statistics Belgium in collaboration with the
National  Bank of  Belgium (NBB),  with  a  unique  Firm-Upstreamness  data  set  derived  from the
NBB B2B transactions data set, developed by Dhyne et al. (2015). The latter, following the
methodology  presented  in  Antras  et  al.  (2012),  enables  us  to  have  a  direct  measure  of  the
upstreamness of (almost) each manufacturing firm surveyed in the SES in each year. Information
on upstreamness is not available prior to 2002. Hence, our merged SES/Firm-Upstreamness
5sample covers all years from 2002 to 2010. Our final sample consists of a pooled cross-sectional
data set of 252,550 observations. It is representative of all workers employed in manufacturing
firms (employing at least 10 workers) over the period 2002-2010.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of selected variables for the overall sample
and by gender. We notice a clear-cut difference in average working conditions of male and female
workers. On average, the total gross hourly wage is lower for women (14.9 EUR) than for men
(17.5 EUR).6 The gender wage gap stands at 17.5%. Women are somewhat younger than men in
our sample. On average, they also have less years of tenure than their male counterparts, but more
years of education. Women are more likely to have a fixed term employment contract (4 vs. 3%)
and especially to work part-time (27 vs. 13%). Regarding occupations, we observe a larger share
of men among managers, professionals, craft and machine operators. In contrast, women are
overrepresented in elementary occupations and, particularly, among clerks. The share of workers
covered by a firm-level collective agreement is somewhat higher among men than among women
(46 vs. 40%). As regards upstreamness, the mean number of steps before the production of a firm
meets either domestic or foreign final demand is equal to 2.76 for men and slightly lower for
women (2.66).
3. Estimation strategy and results
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  we  estimate  the  consequences  of  firm-level  upstreamness  on
workers’ wages. We also investigate whether women and men, located at different points of the
earnings’ distribution, benefit equally from potential gains associated to upstreamness. Put
differently,  we provide first  evidence on how upstreamness contributes to the gender wage gap
along the earnings’ distribution.
Our benchmark specification to address these key questions corresponds to the following
semi-logarithmic wage equation:
ln wijt = β0 + β1 upjt + β2 Xit + β3 Zjt + δt + ωijt (1)
6where wijt represents the gross hourly wage (including base pay, overtime compensation, premia
for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual and
irregular bonuses) of worker i employed in firm j at time t. Our main variable of interest, upjt, is
firm’s j level of upstreamness at time t. It measures the steps (weighted distance) before the
production  of  firm  j  at  time  t  meets  either  domestic  or  foreign  final  demand  (see  Dhyne  et  al.
(2015) for more details). Xit is a vector of worker and job characteristics (six dummies for
education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender, a dummy for
part-time, two dummies for the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies);
Zjt includes firm characteristics (the logarithm of firm size (i.e. the number of workers), a dummy
for  the  type  of  financial  and  economic  control,  a  dummy  for  the  level  of  collective  wage
bargaining, and 3 dummies for firms’ sectoral affiliation); δt is a set of 8 year dummies, β0 is the
intercept; β1, β2 and β3 are the parameters to be estimated, and ɷijt is the error term.
Table 2 summarizes the different steps of our empirical strategy.
[Insert Table 2 here]
3.1. Benchmark estimates
Model  1  (see  Table  2)  is  our  baseline  specification.  In  this  model,  we  regress  the  logarithm of
individual gross hourly wages solely on the upstreamnnes variable. This is done using ordinary
least squares (OLS), with HAC (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) standard errors,
on the full sample of 252,550 observations covering the period 2002-2010. As shown in column
(1) of Table 3, results highlight the existence of a significant positive relationship between
upstreamness and workers’ wages (coefficient = 0.048).
[Insert Table 3 here]
A first potential bias derives from the simultaneous use of grouped observations and
individual data. Indeed, the upstreamness variable is measured at the firm level while wages are
observed for individual workers. To account for these group effects, which might distort the
significance of our estimate, Model 2 applies the correction for common variance components
within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). This correction transforms
the covariance matrix of the errors but leaves the point estimates and the determination coefficient
unaffected. Therefore, our second model has the same estimated coefficient than our baseline
7model,  but  a  different  t-statistic.  Findings,  reported  in  column  (2)  of  Table  3,  support  the
overestimation phenomenon demonstrated by Moulton (1990). However, the regression
coefficient for upstreamness remains significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, it appears that
the significant positive relationship between wages and upstreamness cannot be attributed to
group effects.
The omitted variable bias is obviously another important issue that has to be investigated.
Model  3  accounts  for  this  issue  by  controlling  for  the  full  set  of  detailed  worker,  job  and  firm
characteristics presented in equation (1). To address business cycle effects, year dummies are also
included in the regression. Results, presented in column (3) of Table 3, show that the wage-
upstreamness coefficient remains highly significant but drops to 0.025 when adding these
covariates. Economically speaking, this coefficient suggests that if firms’ upstreamness increases
by one step (i.e. if a firm moves one step further away from the final consumer), workers’ wages
rise on average by 2.5 percent.
Although Model 3 seems quite accurate, estimates might be biased due to the endogeneity
of upstreamness. Endogeneity might be an issue due to: i) the possible correlation between
upstreamness and the export behaviour of firms (i.e. the number of steps before firms’ production
meets final demand is likely to be bigger among exporting firms), and ii) evidence supporting
reverse causality between the export behaviour of firms and workers’ wages (i.e. more productive
firms pay higher wages and are more likely to export).7 To  address  this  potential  issue,  we  re-
estimated Model 3 by two-stage least squares (2SLS) using as instrumental variables the one- and
two-year lagged values of the upstreamness variable, in addition to all other covariates included in
Model  3.  2SLS  estimates  are  reported  in  column  (4)  of  Table  3.  They  show  that  the  wage-
upstreamness coefficient becomes insignificant and reaches a magnitude of 0.078.
To assess the soundness of the 2SLS approach, an array of diagnoses tests have been
performed. The latter are reported at the bottom of column (4) in Table 3. First-stage estimates
indicate that current and lagged values of upstreamness are positively and significantly correlated.
They thus suggest that our IVs are not weak, which is also corroborated by the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F statistic for weak identification. The latter is indeed bigger than 10.8 Moreover, we can
reject the null hypothesis that our first-stage equation is under-identified. The Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic is indeed found to be highly significant. Concerning the quality of our instruments,
we  further  find  that  the  p-value  associated  to  the  Hansen’s  J  overidentification  test  is  equal  to
0.507. This implies that our instruments are valid, i.e. we cannot reject the exogeneity of the latter.
Finally, as regards the endogeneity test, the p-value associated to the Chi-squared statistic is equal
to 0.280.9 This outcome suggests that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity should not be
8rejected. Estimates thus indicate that our main explanatory variable, i.e. firm-level upstreamness,
is actually not endogenous and that OLS estimates (reported in column (3) of Table 3) should be
preferred to those obtained by 2SLS.
To test for a potential non-linear relationship between upstreamness and workers’ wages,
we further estimate the following variant of equation (1):
ln wijt = β0 + β1.1 upD1jt + β1.2 upD2jt + β2 Xit + β3 Zjt + δt + ωijt (2)
where upD1jt (upD2jt) is a dummy variable equal to one if firm j’s level of upstreamness at time t
ranges between 2.5 and 4.5 steps (is greater than 4.5 steps). The reference category in this
equation is thus composed of workers employed in firms with a level of upstreamness below 2.5
steps. OLS estimates of equation (2) are reported in Appendix Table A1. They support the
existence of a fairly linear and upward-sloping relationship between upstreamness and wages.
Indeed, workers employed in firms with a level of upstreamness ranging between 2.5 and 4.5
steps (above 4.5 steps) are found to have a significant wage premia of around 2.9% (5.2%) with
respect to the reference category.10
3.2 Estimates along the wage distribution and by gender
[Insert Table 4 here]
So far, the consequences of firm-level upstreamnness have been investigated at the mean value of
the earnings’ distribution. However, the gains associated to upstreamness might be significantly
different for high- and low-wage workers. To examine this issue, we rely on Unconditional
Quantile Regressions (UQR) with block-bootstrapped standard errors (Cameron et al., 2008;
Daouli et al., 2013; Firpo et al., 2009; Fitzenberg and Kurz, 2003). As a robustness test, we also
apply the more conventional Conditional Quantile Regressions’ (CQR) approach (Koenker and
Basset, 1978; Machado and Mata, 2005; Melly, 2005), though adapted to clustered data as
suggested by Parente and Silva (2016).  Results,  reported in Table 4,  show that UQR and CQR
estimates are relatively close to each other. They both indicate that the wage-upstreamness
coefficient increases monotonically along the earnings’ distribution. Indeed, UQR (CQR)
estimates vary from 1.2 (1.4) for people located at the 25th percentile of the earnings’ distribution
to 4.5 (2.2) for those at the 75th percentile.  High-wage  workers  are  thus  found  to  benefit
9significantly more from being employed in more upstream firms than their lower-wages
counterparts.
[Insert Table 5 here]
[Insert Table 6 here]
Another important issue is whether the gains associated to upstreamness are shared equally
between  women  and  men.  Results  reported  in  column  (1)  of  Tables  5  and  6  indicate  that
upstreamness is beneficial for both groups of workers. However, they also show that the gains are
much smaller for women than for men. When firms’ upstreamness increases by one step, men’
wages are found to rise on average by 2.9 percent. For women, the corresponding wage increase
is only equal to 0.6 percent.11 Turning to quantile estimates by gender, we observe again a striking
difference in the magnitude of regression coefficients for women and men. Findings, presented in
columns (2) to (4) of Table 5, show that the wage-upstreamness coefficient for men follows a
similar pattern than for the overall sample: it increases significantly along the wage distribution
(from 0.013 to 0.036 when moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile). The situation for women
is quite different (see columns (2) to (4) of Table 6): the elasticity is very small (0.002 at the 25th
percentile) and increases only slightly (0.005) at higher quantiles.
Overall, results suggest that the gains associated to upstreamness are very unequally shared
among workers. Most of the gains are for high-wage men. Low-wage men and especially women
(irrespective of their level of earnings) benefit much less from being employed in more upstream
firms.
3.3. Upstreamness and the gender wage gap
To estimate the contribution of the upstreamness variable to the gender wage gap at each quantile,
we apply an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition based on UQR techniques,
namely  the  methodology developed  by  Fortin  et  al.  (2011).  Our  purpose  is  to  estimate,  at  each
quantile of the wage distribution, which proportion of the overall gender wage gap can be
attributed to: i) differences in mean values of upstreamness for women and men (i.e. the
compositional effect or explained part); and ii) gender differences in wage-upstreamness
coefficients (i.e. the wage structure effect or unexplained part). Mean and quantile decompositions
are presented in Table 7.
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[Insert Table 7 here]
The  first  row  of  Table  7  reports  the  overall  gender  wage  gap,  measured  as  the  difference
between mean log wages of male and female workers. The mean log wage differential is equal to
0.147. It does not vary substantially across quantiles. Table 7 also reports the contribution of
upstreamness (both the compositional and wage structure effects) to the gender wage gap in
percentage points (‘Magnitude’) and as a percentage of the overall gender wage gap (‘%”). At the
mean, only 1.36 percent of the gender wage gap is due to male-female differences in the level of
upstreamness. In contrast, almost 41 percent of the gap can be attributed to differences in the
wage-upstreamness semi-elasticity for women and men. This wage structure effect (or
unexplained part) is often taken to reflect discrimination (i.e. factors not related to differences in
endowments/productivity).12
Moving to the quantile decomposition, we find that results are in line with mean-based
findings, yet more heterogeneous. The explanatory power of the compositional effect is very
limited. Even at the 75th percentile of the earnings’ distribution, it accounts for less than 4 percent
of  the  overall  gender  wage  gap.  As  regards  the  wage  structure  effect,  its  explanatory  power  is
quite substantial and increases along the wage distribution. Gender differences in wage premia
associated to upstreamness are thus found to explain a substantial part of the earnings gap
between women and men at the bottom and, even more, at the top of the distribution.
4. Sensitivity tests
In this section, sensitivity tests are performed using different components of workers’ wages. We
first aim to identify the role of compensating differentials associated to longer and more atypical
hours (i.e. over-time and shift/night/weekend work) to explain gender differences in wage-
upstreamness semi-elasticities.13 Therefore, we re-estimate our benchmark equation by gender
and quantile using as dependent variable the log of individual gross hourly wages, excluding
overtime compensation and premia for shift/night/weekend work.
OLS estimates for the overall sample are in line with our benchmark scenario (see upper part
of Appendix Table A2). We find a positive and significant relationship between upstreamness and
workers’ wages. However, the magnitude of the wage-upstreamness coefficient is somewhat
smaller when excluding compensation for overtime, shift/night/weekend work. It is now equal to
0.020 (as opposed to 0.025 in our benchmark specification). Results by gender show a drop in the
coefficient for men (from 0.029 in the benchmark to 0.023), while that for women remains almost
11
unchanged (0.007 instead of 0.006). Yet, differences in coefficients for women and men are still
substantial. In addition, estimates by quantile are smaller than in the benchmark, especially for
men. However, they deliver a similar message. The wage-upstreamness semi-elasticity increases
along the wage distribution for men (from 0.011 at the 25th percentile to 0.023 at the 75th
percentile) and is much smaller for women (around 0.003), irrespective of their earnings. As
regards the wage decomposition, results are overall in line with our benchmark analysis (see
Appendix Table A3). Gender differences in wage-upstreamness semi-elasticities still explain
around 35 percent of the overall gender wage gap and the contribution of this unexplained part
increases along the earnings’ distribution.
We  also  test  the  robustness  of  our  findings  with  alternative  definitions  of  wages.  As  an
illustration,  Appendix  Table  A4  shows  quantile  regression  estimates  by  gender  using  workers’
base pay (i.e. gross hourly wages excluding overtime compensation, premia for
shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual and irregular
bonuses). Results are in line with our benchmark specification. Indeed, they show that the wage-
upstreamness semi-elasticity is significantly bigger for (high-wage) men than for women.
Interestingly, this is also the case when focusing on alternative components of workers’ wages
(e.g. annual and irregular bonuses).14 In addition, Appendix Table A5 shows that almost 30
percent of the gender wage gap in base pay is due to differences in wage-upstreamness semi-
elasticities for women and men, and that the contribution of this unexplained component increases
at upper quantiles.
Overall, sensitivity tests indicate that the larger wage premium obtained by (male high-wage)
workers employed in more upstream firms is not solely driven by differences in overtime hours
and shift/night/weekend work, but also by differences in other pay components,  including basic
pay and bonuses.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an original contribution to the literature on social upgrading related to firms’
participation in Global Value Chains (GVCs). More precisely, it is the first to estimate the impact
of  a direct measure  of  firm-level  upstreamness  (i.e.  the  steps  –  weighted  distance  –  before  the
production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand) on workers’ wages. It also
adds to the existing literature by examining whether results vary for women and men and, more
generally, how upstreamness contributes to the explanation of the gender wage gap along the
earnings’ distribution. To do so, we rely on detailed matched employer-employee data relative to
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the Belgian manufacturing sector that have been merged with a unique Firm-Upstreamness data
set derived from the NBB B2B transactions data set, developed by Dhyne et al. (2015). The latter
provides a direct and accurate measure of firm-level upstreamness for all years from 2002 to
2010.
Our findings show that workers earn significantly higher wages when being employed in
more upstream firms (i.e. in firms that are further away from the final consumer), even after
controlling for group effects in the residuals, a large set of individual, job and firm characteristics,
time fixed effects, as well as for the endogeneity of upstreamness. Our most robust estimate
suggests that if firm-level upstreamness increases by one step (i.e. by approximately one standard
deviation), workers’ gross hourly wages rise on average by 2.5 percent. Yet, the gains from
upstreamness are found to be very unequally distributed among workers. The wage-upstreamness
semi-elasticity is almost five times bigger for men than for women (0.029 vs. 0.006). Moreover,
quantile regressions indicate that high-wage men benefit substantially more from upstreamness
than their low-wage counterparts. For women, the benefits of working in more upstream firms
appear to be very limited, irrespectively of how much they earn. A quantile decomposition of the
gender wage gap further shows that differences in mean values of upstreamness for women and
men only modestly contribute to the overall gender wage gap. On the contrary, gender differences
in wage premia associated to upstreamness are found to explain a substantial part of the earnings
gap, especially at the top of the earnings distribution.
Sensitivity tests, focusing on different components of workers’ wages, indicate that the
higher wage-upstreamness semi-elasticity for (high-wage) men is partly driven by differences in
over-time and shift/night/weekend work. However, this is not the whole story. Indeed, the wage
premium associated to upstreamness is still found to be substantially larger for (high-wage) men
than  for  women  when  considering  other  pay  components,  such  as  base  pay  or  irregular/annual
bonuses. This suggests that rents generated by more upstream firms are unfairly distributed
between (high-wage) men and women. Put differently, it appears that the unexplained part of the
gender wage gap, associated to upstreamness, is at least partly reflective of non-productive
factors. The latter might be related to power and authority associated to certain higher-level
occupations, more likely to be held by high-wage men (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Osterman et al.,
2009). A complementary interpretation, provided by Card et al. (2015: 634), is that women, in a
given occupation, “are less likely to initiate wage bargaining with their employer and are (often)
less effective negotiators than men”.15 Interestingly, these arguments echo the estimates of
Garnero et al. (2014) showing that women generate employer rents in the Belgian private sector
13
and  that  these  rents  derive  from  the  fact  that  women  earn  less  than  men  at  any  given  level  of
productivity.
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Notes
1. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) categorize four different types of economic upgrading: i)
process upgrading, where inputs are transformed into outputs through a more efficient
production process; ii) product upgrading, which implies a shift towards more sophisticated
product lines; iii) functional upgrading, which implies increasing the overall skill content of
activities by acquiring new (or abandoning old) functions; iv) chain or inter-sectoral
upgrading, where firms move from one industry to another (often related).
2. The ILO Report IV on Decent work in global supply chains (ILO, 2016), defines social
upgrading as “the gradual process leading to decent work in global supply chains” and it is
measured  through  four  pillars  of  the  ILO  Decent  Work  Agenda:  employment,  social
protection, social dialogue and rights at work, alongside gender equality and non-
discrimination as crosscutting objectives.
3. A few i)  micro enterprises,  which are almost sole traders and who do not have to fill  VAT
declarations, and ii) firms that have no enterprise-to-enterprise transactions inside Belgium
(i.e. they only import, export or sell to final demand) are not included in Dhyne et al.’s (2015)
dataset. Also note that the upstreamness measure only considers production steps that involve
a transaction between two firms. Initial production steps such as R&D or design may
typically not imply a transaction between the firm that makes those steps and the contractor
that produces the good.
4. We had access to a fully anonymized version of the merged data which prevents from
directly identifying an individual firm.
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5. The SES is a cross-sectional data set, i.e. it does not enable to follow workers over time. It is
representative of all firms in the manufacturing industry employing at least 10 workers. For
an extended discussion see Demunter (2000).
6. Our measure of workers’ gross hourly wage includes: base pay, overtime compensation,
premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual
and irregular bonuses.
7. See e.g. Macis and Schivardi (2016).
8. As suggested by van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011), we rely on the standard ‘rule of thumb’
that weak identification is problematic for F statistics smaller than 10.
9. The test is based on the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation in
which the upstreamness variable is treated as endogenous, and one in which it is treated as
exogenous. If the null hypothesis of this test cannot be rejected, then instrumentation is
actually not necessary.
10. Alternative specifications, including polynomials of the upstreamness variable, have been
tested too. The inclusion of the upstreamness variable as a polynomial of order 2 in equation
(2)  led  to  strong  multicollinearity  issues.  Therefore,  we  have  chosen  to  report  regression
results using dummy variables identifying firms with varying upstreamness levels.
11. We tested for the endogeneity of the upstreamness variable in regressions estimated
separately  for  women  and  men  (following  the  same  approach  as  in  section  3.1).  Post-
estimation tests again indicate that our variable of interest is not endogenous (p-values
associated to the endogeneity tests are respectively equal to 0.62 and 0.26 in the 2SLS
regressions for men and women, respectively). We have confidence in the validity of these
tests since the instruments used in the 2SLS (i.e. one and two-year lagged values of
upstreamness)  are  sound:  the  tests  for  weak-,  over-,  and  under-identification  imply  that  the
instrumentation is satisfactory. Therefore, as in our benchmark specification, the OLS
estimator is to be preferred.
12. Yet, the unexplained part might also reflect differences in unobserved productivity-related
characteristics.
13. Descriptive statistics, reported in Table 1, show than men are more likely to receive overtime
compensation and premia for shift/night/weekend work than women.
14. The full set of results for the different components of workers’ wages is available upon
request.
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15. Gender segregation and/or discrimination in performance-related pay might also be part
of the explanation (for a discussion see McGee et al. (2015) and Xiu and Gunderson
(2013)).
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Table 1: Means (standard deviations) of selected variables, 2002-2010
Variables Overall Men Women
Gross hourly wage (in EUR)a 16.9
(7.7)
17.5
(8.0)
14.9
(6.0)
Upstreamness (in steps)b 2.74 2.76 2.66
(89.5) (89.8) (88.1)
Age structure of workforce (% workers)
20-24 years 5.9 6.1 5.5
25-29 years 11.4 11.1 12.6
30-34 years 13.8 13.2 16.1
35-39 years 16.4 15.9 18.2
40-44 years 17.1 17.2 17.0
45-49 years 15.3 15.5 14.4
50-54 years 12.3 12.9 10.2
55-59 years 5.7 6.1 4.3
60 years and more 1.0 1.1 0.7
Education (% workers)
Lower secondary 24.8 25.5 22.4
General upper secondary 18.7 17.3 24.1
Technical/Professional upper secondary 26.2 29.0 16.0
Higher non-university, short-type 12.5 10.6 19.5
University and non-university higher
education, long-type 9.0 9.0 9.1
Post-graduate 0.5 0.9 0.5
Seniority in the company (% workers)
0-1 year 15.4 14.6 18.0
2-4 years 17.5 17.0 19.2
5-9 years 19.3 18.9 20.9
10 years or more 47.6 49.3 41.7
Type of employment contract (% workers)
Permanent contract 96,2 96.4 95.4
Fixed-term contract 3.1 2.9 3.8
Other contract 0.6 0.6 0.6
Part-time (% workers)c 16.3 13.4 26.7
Overtime compensation (Yes, % workers) 6.4 7.4 2.5
Premia for shift/weekend/night work (Yes, % workers) 25.6 28.9 13.3
Occupations (% workers)
Managers 3.0 3.3 1.9
Professionals 7.6 7.6 7.3
Technicians and Associate Professionals 8.6 8.6 8.4
Clerks 11.5 7.4 26.4
Craft 25.0 27.2 16.6
Machine operators 28.6 30.4 22.2
Service 1.3 1.1 1.9
Elementary occupations 5.9 5.4 7.5
Firm-level collective agreement (Yes, % workers) 44.4 45.6 40.2
More than 50% privately-owned firm (Yes, % workers) 97.7 97.5 98.2
Number of observations 252,550 195,683 56,867
Notes: The descriptive statistics refer to the weighted sample. a At 2004 constant prices. It includes base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and
annual and irregular bonuses. b Steps (distance) before the production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign
final demand. cLess than 30 hours per week.
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Table 2: Different steps of the empirical strategy
Models Specifications
Model 1 Estimation of equation (1), without any control variables, by OLS with HAC
(heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) standard errors
Model 2 Model 1 + correction for group effects in the residuals
Model 3 Model 2 + control for year fixed effects & individual, job and firm characteristics
Model 4 Model 3 estimated by 2SLS, using one- and two-year lagged values of upstreamness
as instruments
Model 5 Model 3 estimated using conditional and unconditional quantile regressions
Model 6 Model 5 estimated separately for women and men
Model 7 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender wage gap at different quantiles
Model 8 Sensitivity tests of Models 6 and 7 using different components of workers’ wages
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Table 3: Log wage equation, OLS and 2SLS, overall sample
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage, which includes base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and
annual and irregular bonuses. Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. a Steps (distance) before
the production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics
include: six dummies for education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender, a
dummy for part-time, two dummies for the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c
Firm characteristics include: the logarithm of firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial
and economic control, a dummy for the level of collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on
Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS nomenclature: a dummy for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a
dummy for medium-low-technology manufacturing industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing
industries (the reference category is high-technology manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use
the correction for common variance components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and
Moulton (1990). e The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for under-identification tests whether the equation is
identified, i.e. whether the excluded instruments are all relevant. The null hypothesis in this test is that the
equation is under-identified. f Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic for weak identification is a Wald F statistic testing
whether the excluded instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressor. The null hypothesis
is that the instruments are weak. According to the standard ‘rule of thumb’, weak identification is problematic for
F statistics smaller than 10 (as suggested by van ours and Stoeldraijer (2011)). g The Hansen J statistic tests the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term. h The endogeneity test is based
on the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics: one for the equation in which firm-level upstreamness is
treated as endogenous, and one in which it is treated as exogenous. If the null hypothesis of this test cannot be
rejected, then instrumentation is actually not necessary, i.e. upstreamness can actually be considered as
exogenous. ***/**/*: significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Upstreamnessa 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.025*** 0.078
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.049)
Individual and job characteristicsb No No Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc No No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes Yes
Group effectsd No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.016 0.567 0.550
Model significance:
p-value of F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Underidentification teste:
p-value Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 0.000
Weak identification testf:
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 13.56
Overidentification testg:
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.507
Endogeneity testh:
p-value associated to Chi-squared statistic 0.280
First-stage estimates of 2SLS
(Dependent variable: upstreamnessij at time t)
Upstreamness – lagged by one year (at time t-1) 0.012***
(0.002)
Upstreamness – lagged by two years (at time t -2) 0.005**
(0.002)
Model significance, first stage:
p-value of F test 0.000
Number of observations 252,550 252,550 252,550 252,548
Number of groups - 4,660 4,660 4,660
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Table 4: Log wage equation, OLS, UQR and CQR, overall sample
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage, which includes base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual
and irregular bonuses. Clustered and block bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications), corrected for
heteroscedasticity, are reported in parentheses for OLS/CQR and UQR, respectively. a Steps (distance) before the
production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics include: six
dummies for education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender, a dummy for part-
time, two dummies for the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c Firm characteristics
include: the logarithm of firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and economic control, a
dummy for the level of collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS
nomenclature: a dummy for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy for medium-low-
technology manufacturing industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing industries (the reference
category is high-technology manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use the correction for common
variance components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/*
Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
Overall sample
OLS Quantile estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.045***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
(Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.022***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group effectsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 252,550 252,550 252,550 252,550
Number of groups 4,660 4,660 4,660 4,660
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Table 5: Log wage equation, OLS, UQR and CQR, men
Men
OLS Quantile estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables: (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.036***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
(Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.029*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.026***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group effectsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 195,683 195,683 195,683 195,683
Number of groups 4,649 4,649 4,649 4,649
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage, which includes base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual
and irregular bonuses. Clustered and block bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications), corrected for
heteroscedasticity, are reported in parentheses for OLS/CQR and UQR, respectively. a Steps (distance) before the
production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics include: six
dummies for education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for part-time, two dummies for
the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c Firm characteristics include: the logarithm of
firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and economic control, a dummy for the level of
collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS nomenclature: a dummy
for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy for medium-low-technology manufacturing
industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing industries (the reference category is high-technology
manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within
groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/* Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per
cent, respectively.
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Table 6: Log wage equation, OLS, UQR and CQR, women
Women
OLS Quantile estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables: (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.006** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.005**
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
(Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.006** 0.003* 0.003* 0.006**
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group effectsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 56,867 56,867 56,867 56,867
Number of groups 4,462 4,462 4,462 4,462
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage, which includes base pay,
overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual
and irregular bonuses. Clustered and block bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications), corrected for
heteroscedasticity, are reported in parentheses for OLS/CQR and UQR, respectively. a Steps (distance) before the
production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics include: six
dummies for education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for part-time, two dummies for
the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c Firm characteristics include: the logarithm of
firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and economic control, a dummy for the level of
collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS nomenclature: a dummy
for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy for medium-low-technology manufacturing
industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing industries (the reference category is high-technology
manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within
groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/* Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per
cent, respectively.
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Table 7: Mean and quantile decomposition of the gender wage gap
OLS Quantile estimates
(Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Overall gender wage gap 0.147 0.143 0.139 0.140
Decomposition:
Magnitude:
Compositional effect of upstreamness 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 0.060 0.034 0.053 0.123
% of the overall gender wage gap explained by:
Composition effect of upstreamness 1.36 0.69 1.43 3.57
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 40.8 23.7 38.1 87.8
Notes: Decompositions are based on Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) estimates. For the
sake of clarity, the ‘magnitude’ and the ‘percentage of the overall gender wage gap’ have only been
reported for the upstreamness variable.
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Table A1: Log wage equation, OLS, sensitivity test 1
(Non-linear specification)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual gross hourly wage, which
includes base pay, overtime compensation, premia for shift/night/weekend work, performance-related
pay and commissions, and annual and irregular bonuses. Robust standard errors are reported
between brackets. a The control group is composed of firms whose upstreamness is below 2.5. b
Individual and job characteristics include: six dummies for education, three dummies for tenure,
eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender, a dummy for part-time, two dummies for the type of
employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c Firm characteristics include: the logarithm
of firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and economic control, a dummy
for the level of collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on Eurostat’s (2012)
HT-KIS nomenclature: a dummy for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy
for medium-low-technology manufacturing industries, and a dummy for low-technology
manufacturing industries (the reference category is high-technology manufacturing industries). d
Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups, as
suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/*: significance at the 1, 5 and 10
per cent, respectively.
OLS
Variables
Upstreamness between 2.5 and 4.5 stepsa 0.029***
(0.004)
Upstreamness above 4.5 stepsa 0.052**
(0.016)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes
Year dummies Yes
Group effectsd Yes
Adjusted R2 0.565
Model significance:
p-value of F test 0.000
Number of observations 252,550
Number of groups 4,660
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Table A2: Log wage equation, OLS, UQR and CQR, sensitivity test 2
(Gross hourly wages excluding compensation for overtime and shift/night/weekend work)
Overall
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.028***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.016***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Men
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.023*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.023***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.019***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Women
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.007** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.007** 0.003 0.003* 0.005**
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group effectsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations for:
Overall
Men
Women
252,550
195,683
56,867
252,550
195,683
56,867
252,550
195,683
56,867
252,550
195,683
56,867
Number of groups for:
Overall
Men
Women
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
Notes: The dependent variable is the gross hourly wage, excluding compensation for overtime and
shift/night/weekend work (ln). Clustered and block bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications), corrected for
heteroscedasticity, are reported in parentheses for OLS/CQR and UQR, respectively. a Steps (distance) before the
production of a firm meets either domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics include: six
dummies for education, three dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender (only for overall
sample), a dummy for part-time, two dummies for the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies.
c Firm characteristics include: the logarithm of firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and
economic control, a dummy for the level of collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on
Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS nomenclature: a dummy for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy
for medium-low-technology manufacturing industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing industries (the
reference category is high-technology manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use the correction for
common variance components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/*
Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
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Table A3: Mean and quantile decomposition of the gender wage gap, sensitivity test 3
(Gross hourly wages excluding compensation for overtime and shift/night/weekend work)
OLS Quantile estimates
Mean (.25) (.50) (.75)
Overall gender wage gap 0.118 0.129 0.100 0.098
Decomposition:
Magnitude:
Compositional effect of upstreamness 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 0.041 0.021 0.050 0.071
% of the overall gender wage gap explained by:
Compositional effect of upstreamness 1.69 0.77 2.00 3.06
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 34.7 16.2 50.0 72.4
Notes: Decompositions are based on the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) estimates. For
exposition purposes, the magnitude and the percentage (of the overall gender wage gap) only for the
variable of upstreamness have been reported.
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Table A4: Log wage equation, OLS, UQR and CQR, sensitivity test 4
(Gross hourly base pay, excluding any additional component)
Overall
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.026***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.012***
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Men
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.022***
Upstreamnessa (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.015***
Upstreamnessa (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women
OLS Quantile estimates
Variables (Mean) (.25) (.50) (.75)
Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 0.005** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Conditional Quantile Regression (CQR) 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.004**
Upstreamnessa (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Individual and job characteristicsb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm characteristicsc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group effectsd Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations for:
Overall
Men
Women
252,529
195,662
56,867
252,529
195,662
56,867
252,529
195,662
56,867
252,529
195,662
56,867
Number of groups for:
Overall
Men
Women
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
4,660
4,649
4,462
Notes: The dependent variable is the gross hourly base pay, excluding overtime compensation, premia for
shift/night/weekend work, performance-related pay and commissions, and annual and irregular bonuses (ln).
Clustered and block bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications), corrected for heteroscedasticity, are reported
in parentheses for OLS/CQR and UQR, respectively. a Steps (distance) before the production of a firm meets either
domestic or foreign final demand. b Individual and job characteristics include: six dummies for education, three
dummies for tenure, eight dummies for age, a dummy for gender (only for overall sample), a dummy for part-time,
two dummies for the type of employment contract, and seven occupational dummies. c Firm characteristics include:
the logarithm of firm size (number of workers), a dummy for the type of financial and economic control, a dummy for
the level of collective wage bargaining, and three sectoral dummies based on Eurostat’s (2012) HT-KIS nomenclature:
a dummy for medium-high-technology manufacturing industries, a dummy for medium-low-technology
manufacturing industries, and a dummy for low-technology manufacturing industries (the reference category is high-
technology manufacturing industries). d Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance
components within groups, as suggested by Greenwald (1983) and Moulton (1990). ***/**/* Significance at the
1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.
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Table A5: Mean and quantile decomposition of the gender wage gap, sensitivity test 5
(Gross hourly base pay, excluding any additional component)
OLS Quantile estimates
Mean (.25) (.50) (.75)
Overall gender wage gap 0.108 0.121 0.097 0.084
Decomposition:
Magnitude:
Compositional effect of upstreamness 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 0.032 0.018 0.046 0.071
% of the overall gender wage gap explained by:
Compositional effect of upstreamness 0.92 0.82 2.06 3.57
Wage structure effect of upstreamness 29.6 14.8 47.4 84.5
Notes: Decompositions are based on the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) estimates. For
exposition purposes, the magnitude and the percentage (of the overall gender wage gap) only for the
variable of upstreamness have been reported.
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